Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique.
According to him, there is the purposive rational action which is also called instrumental rationality action. This type of rationality is associated with the expectations concerning the behavior of human beings or things that exist in the surrounding (Morrison, 1995, 212). The behavioural expectations are the ways through which a given actor uses to achieve some goals or ends. The ends, from.
Instrumental rationality is not itself a myth: there really is a distinctive aspect of rationality that deserves the label of “instrumental rationality”. In the first two sections of this essay, I shall start by giving a rough intuitive description of the phenomenon that seems to me the best candidate for the label “instrumental rationality”. As we shall see, this rough description.
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Instrumental Rationality and Moral Philosophy An Essay on the Virtues of Cooperation. Authors (view affiliations) Bruno Verbeek; Book. 10 Citations; 853 Downloads; Part of the Theory and Decision Library book series (TDLA, volume 33) Log in to check access. Buy eBook. USD 139.00 Buy eBook. USD 139.00 Instant download; Readable on all devices; Own it forever; Local sales tax included if.
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Instrumental rationality is regularly viewed as a definite form of rationality centering on the most effective or cost-effective resources to attain a definite end, but not in itself redirecting on the significance of that end. It can also be explained as a way of thinking about the world which in some senses stops us thinking about non-instrumental values so that more and more things are.
This essay continues my critique of the cognitivist view that the norms on intention of instrumental rationality and consistency are, at bottom, norms of theoretical rationality on one’s beliefs. It critically examines the cognitivist views of Gilbert Harman, J. David Velleman, Kieran Setiya, and John Broome. The essay sketches a proposed alternative to such cognitivism: the practical.